The case of Mathews v Ipswich City Council [2023] QDC 21 concerned an appeal by a landowner (Appellant) to the District Court of Queensland (Court) against convictions brought by the Ipswich City Council (Council) in the Magistrates Court of Queensland at Ipswich for the contravention of enforcement notices and a local law.

On 7 January 2021, the Appellant was convicted of three charges including two counts of the contravention under section 168(5) of the Planning Act 2016 (Qld) (Planning Act) of an enforcement notice and the contravention of section 36(a) of the Ipswich City Council Local Law No 1 (Administration) 2013 (Local Law) for the use of language that is insulting, offensive, or threatening in relation to an authorised person.

The Appellant was unwell on the day of the hearing of the convictions and was unable to attend however did not request an adjournment. The Appellant was therefore convicted of the charges in the Appellant's absence under section 142A(4)(a) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) (Justices Act). The Appellant appealed against the convictions under section 222 of the Justices Act.

In determining the appeal, the Court considered the following:

1. Whether the procedure prescribed by section 142A(4) of the Justices Act was followed by the Magistrate who decided the Appellant's convictions (Magistrate) in the Appellant's absence.

2. Whether the procedure prescribed by section 142A(12) of the Justices Act was followed by the Appellant.

3. Whether it was open to the Magistrate to conclude that each of the charges against the Appellant could be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

4. Whether any of the grounds of appeal could be successfully relied on by the Appellant.

The Court found that the appeal had no prospects of success and must be dismissed.

Section 142A(4)(a) of the Justices Act prescribes a procedure to be followed by the court before which the complaint comes for hearing where there has been a "simple offence", being an offence that is punishable summarily, and the complaint was made by a public officer, both of which were present in these circumstances (at [6]).

The defendant, which in this case is the Appellant, must also have been "…required to appear at a time and place fixed for the hearing of the complaint…" and received notice, yet failed to appear (see section 142A(4)(b) of the Justices Act). The Court was satisfied of these elements as the Appellant's actions indicated that the Appellant had notice of the hearing date (at [7]).

The Court found that the Magistrate correctly observed the procedure prescribed by the Justices Act in proceeding in the Appellant's absence (at [8]).

The Court noted that the Appellant did not observe the procedure under section 142A(12) of the Justices Act which required the Appellant to apply for a rehearing within two months after the Magistrate's decision, if the Appellant intended to challenge its merits (at [9]).

Whilst the appeal could have been dismissed for this reason, the Court nonetheless considered the matter as if the correct procedure for a rehearing under section 222 of the Justices Act had been followed by the Appellant (at [13]).

The Appellant also filed the Notice of Appeal out of time, which could be explained by the Appellant's incarceration, and an extension of time was allowed by the Court, subject to there being any merit in the grounds of appeal (at [14]).

The first and third charges against the Appellant related to the contravention of enforcement notices which the Appellant had been given for signage erected at the front of the Appellant's house, as well as multiple shipping containers which had been repurposed for habitation by the Appellant. These both constituted assessable development for which a development approval was required, but which had not been obtained.

The Appellant was given show cause notices and subsequent enforcement notices in respect of the first and third charge, and the Appellant did not appeal or comply with those notices. The Court was satisfied that the Magistrate correctly concluded that the first and third charges were proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The second charge related to the Appellant's use of language that is insulting, offensive, and threatening in relation to an authorised person, being a Council officer, who was inspecting the Appellant's land after becoming aware of the shipping containers and obtaining a warrant under section 130 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) (LG Act) in order to measure them for compliance (at [25]).

The Court was satisfied that the Appellant had verbally abused the Council officer in contravention of section 36(a) of the Local Law which prohibits the use of such language against an authorised person. The Court therefore found that the Magistrate was correct in concluding that the second charge had also been proved beyond reasonable doubt (at [26]).

The Appellant sought to rely on a constitutional right to freedom of political communication in relation to the signage and argued that it was "political communication and election advertising" (at [35]). The Appellant also argued that under section 36(5) of the LG Act any law which seeks to prohibit or regulate the placement of election signs or posters must not be made by a local government as provided under section 36(1) of the LG Act.

The Court did not accept that the signage constituted "election signs or posters" and noted that the laws governing them were, in any event, not local but State laws (see [38] to [39]). The Court was also not satisfied that the charges involved any matters arising under the Australian Constitution (at [40]).

The Court concluded that the appeal had no prospects of success. The application for an extension of time to file the Notice of Appeal was refused and the appeal was dismissed.