The case of Parklands Blue Metal Pty Ltd v Sunshine Coast Regional Council [2025] QCA 207 concerned an appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal (Court) overturning a previous decision of the Planning and Environment Court of Queensland (P&E Court). 

The parties agreed that Parklands Blue Metal Pty Ltd (Parklands) should make some form of contribution towards the maintenance of a haulage road. However, the means by which and extent to which Parklands should be responsible for the maintenance was the subject of the dispute. Parklands contended that it should pay a 'levy' towards the maintenance of the road, calculated as a figure per tonne of material extracted (Levy Condition). The Sunshine Coast Regional Council (Council) contended for conditions which require Parklands to maintain the haulage road over the life of the development (Maintenance Conditions). The P&E Court found that a levy as proposed by Parklands is unlawful, and held that a maintenance regime should be implemented through an amended conditions package. The regime was to be the quarry operator's responsibility. 

Parklands applied for leave to appeal to the Court, contending that the P&E Court fell into various errors which it characterised as errors of law. The Court granted leave to appeal, and held that the P&E Court erred in finding that the Maintenance Conditions were not an "unreasonable imposition" and were "reasonably required". The Court ordered that the Maintenance Conditions be set aside and remitted the matter back to the P&E Court to determine if any further conditions ought to be imposed.

In 2009, Parklands submitted a development application for a hard rock quarry in Yandina. The Council refused the development application in October 2011. The refusal was successfully appealed to the P&E Court.

In June 2017, the P&E Court in the case of Parklands Blue Metal Pty Ltd v Sunshine Coast Regional Council & Ors [2017] QPEC 35; [2017] QPELR 809 considered conditions that were in dispute between the parties and made orders that conditions be imposed as agreed between the parties during the proceedings. In September 2024, the P&E Court heard from the parties in respect of a dispute about the Maintenance Conditions. The P&E Court's decision in the case of Parklands Blue Metal Pty Ltd v Sunshine Coast Regional Council & Ors (No. 3) [2024] QPEC 52 in December 2024 determined the dispute in favour of the Council, which was the subject of our March 2024 article. 

Parklands argued the following four grounds of appeal (at [11]):

1. That the development conditions requiring Parklands to be responsible for the maintenance of the haulage route for the life of the quarry unlawfully shifted the Council's statutory maintenance obligations onto Parklands.

2. That there is no power to impose the Levy Condition as part of the conditions because there was a failure to conclude that section 5.1.2 of the relevant planning legislation, being the now repealed Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) (IPA), conferred such power.

3. That there was a failure to determine whether future routine maintenance work may constitute operational works.

4. That the Levy Condition, if within power, should nevertheless not be imposed. 

In considering each of the grounds of appeal, the Court considered each of the following issues (at [12]):

1. Firstly, whether there was any statutory power to impose the Maintenance Conditions or the Levy Condition. 

2. Secondly, whether it was unreasonable to impose the Maintenance Conditions. 

3. Finally, whether the P&E Court made an error of law by determining not to impose the Levy Condition.

Overview of the statutory scheme

The dispute required a consideration of sections 3.5.30 and 3.5.32 of the IPA and what conditions must be and must not do.

Section 3.5.30(1) of the IPA states as follows:

"(1)    A condition must—

(a)    be relevant to, but not an unreasonable imposition on, the development or use of premises as a consequence of the development; or
 
(b)    be reasonably required in respect of the development or use of premises as a consequence of the development."

The parties agreed that the imposition of the Levy Condition or the Maintenance Conditions was "relevant to" the development. The dispute was whether such imposition was an "unreasonable imposition" or is "reasonably required" (see [15] to [16]).

Section 3.5.32 of the IPA outlines what a condition must not do and states as follows:

"(1)    A condition must not—
         …

(b)    for infrastructure to which chapter 5, part 1 applies, require (other than under chapter 5, part 1)—
(c)    

(i)    a monetary payment for the establishment, operating and maintenance costs of the infrastructure; or

(ii)    works to be carried out for the infrastructure; or

(d)    state that works required to be carried out for a development must be undertaken by an entity other than the applicant;
…"

The focus of the appeal was on section 3.5.32(1)(b) of the IPA which requires consideration of section 5.1.2 of the IPA, which is in chapter 5, part 1, and states as follows:

"(1)    If a local government imposes a condition about non-trunk infrastructure, the condition may only be for supplying infrastructure for 1 or more of the following—

(a)    networks internal to the premises;

(b)    connecting the premises to external infrastructure networks;

(c)    protecting or maintaining the safety or efficiency of the infrastructure network of which the non-trunk infrastructure is a component.

(2)    The condition must state—

(a)    the infrastructure to be supplied; and

(b)    when the infrastructure must be supplied."

The Court held that it was within the power of section 5.1.2 of the IPA to impose the Maintenance Conditions as they are "about" non-trunk infrastructure and "for" supplying infrastructure; in other words, the Maintenance Conditions are for maintaining the efficiency of the infrastructure network of which the haulage road forms part. However, the imposition of these conditions was primarily challenged on the basis that they are not reasonable in the context of section 3.5.30 of the IPA (at [62]).

The Court considered whether there is a statutory power to impose the Levy Condition. Relevantly, it found that section 5.1.2(1) of the IPA "…permits a condition about non-trunk infrastructure only for supplying infrastructure and that the supplying is for a specified purposes" (at [72]). 

The Court determined that the language of section 5.1.2(2) of the IPA provides an indication that a condition requiring the payment of money is not one contemplated by section 5.1.2(1) of the IPA. Further it found that even if a condition could fall into the broad language of section 5.1.2(1) of the IPA, the obligation for a developer to make such a payment is not itself the supply of infrastructure (at [92]).

The Court held that the P&E Court correctly determined that section 5.1.2 of the IPA does not permit the imposition of a condition requiring a financial contribution for the cost of road maintenance, like the Levy Condition (at [96]).

Parklands argued that the Maintenance Conditions do not meet the requirements in section 3.5.30(1) of the IPA for a number of reasons, the pertinent ones being as follows: 

1. The proposal for a new road is likely to save the Council costs as they would otherwise have to maintain the current unsealed road. The Court considered this to be a significant omission of a highly relevant matter (see [107] to [110]). 

2. Over the approximate 40 year life of the development, it is possible for the benefits to be enjoyed by others, without any mechanism to reduce Parklands' obligations to continue road maintenance (at [106]).

3. Exposure to third party claims who suffer loss or damage as a result of alleged defects for the maintenance of the road, complicated by the fact that the Council retains control of the road. This was not considered a material consideration in relation to the reasonableness of the condition (at [113]). 

4. The obligation to maintain the road may require further operational works approvals. The Court considered that there was a possibility, albeit remote, that the requirement to obtain operational works approvals will make the performance of the condition more difficult (at [121]). 

5. The planning scheme policies do not expressly require a proponent to be responsible for providing long term road maintenance. The Court considered that the Council did not view this circumstance as being engaged frequently enough to make provision for it in the planning scheme policies (at [123]).

6. There was a reliable and well-established means of obtaining a contribution by Parklands, even if not in the form of a levy as proposed. The Court held that other possibilities can arise (at [125]).

The P&E Court concluded that "It is hard to see how it would be unreasonable to require the operator of the quarry to maintain the haulage route which is for the benefit of the quarry, necessary to its operation and which will be the main cause of the need for maintenance" (at [126]). The Court departed from this finding, noting that the P&E Court did not take into account the saved current maintenance costs as a benefit of the upgraded road, and going further to say the conditions imposed are "…ones which no assessment manager could reasonably come to" (at [127]). 

Despite determining that there was no power to impose the Levy Condition, the Court went on to consider whether, if there was a power, it ought to be imposed. 
The Court noted that the P&E Court was discouraged from adopting the Levy Condition because of some minor errors and the lack of precision in the costing data. The Court concluded that this reflected the P&E Court's pessimism about being able to assess a levy in order to reflect the actual costs to the Council (at [137]). 
The Court determined that an inability to calculate the costs with precision is not necessarily a bar to the inclusion of a condition requiring a financial contribution as being reasonable (at [137]).

The Court held that the P&E Court made an error of law in relation to the imposition of the Maintenance Conditions and the decision of the P&E Court was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the P&E Court for further consideration as to whether any further conditions are to be imposed.